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Foreword
Mergers of all types are going on across the health care system. In some cases, they are 
horizontal mergers in which the same kinds of entities are coming together. In other cases, 
they are vertical mergers in which different types of health care entities are coming together.
There are various and sometimes shifting rationales presented by the merging providers—to 
improve the quality of care, to preserve and grow employment, to build capacity in order to 
manage the needs of entire populations, or to do more clinical research, gain greater lever-
age with large payers, or preserve essential community services. Regardless of the “cause,” 
the effect of proposed consolidations poses great challenges to state regulators and policy-
makers.
These new entities are large and economically and politically powerful institutions. More-
over, in spite of applicant claims, the evidence from hospital consolidations is clear—they 
raise rather than lower operating costs. Finally, the standards by which mergers are usually 
evaluated reflect fundamentally conflicting policy desires to see health care as a service 
that providers compete to provide, and a public good provided by institutions with deep 
and fundamental public obligations. 
These conflicts are heightened when the consolidation results in the creation of a monopoly 
provider with a significant portion of the services provided. Without reasonable alterna-
tives to the provider, what will be the motivation for the consolidated provider to deliver 
high-quality medical services at a reasonable price?  
State and federal laws can grant state officials the authority to create and oversee such 
service monopolies through the issuance of a certificate of public advantage (COPA), where 
the advantage of the monopoly accrues to the public, not the organization. Although never 
simple to establish and oversee, and not always politically popular, COPAs may be the only 
alternative states face to denying monopoly-creating provider consolidations. 
This report, written by Erin C. Fuse Brown, JD, MPH, from Georgia State University College 
of Law and the Center for Law, Health, and Society, captures the response to a proposed 
merger that would create virtually a single hospital provider for a large swath of rural 
Tennessee and Virginia. The report analyzes the process by which officials in both states 
developed their COPAs and the resulting standards and enforcement tools. The report also 
addresses the environment in which the COPA evolved, the application process, the role of 
each state, and policy implications for other states.   
 
The report raises interesting policy questions: 
•  First, we can view COPAs in the context of federalism. A new state regulatory scheme 
evolved as a substitute for federal antitrust scrutiny. Industry advocated for the states 
to take this on, even if it meant more state regulation. The two states ended up  
taking more control and responsibility for the processes and outcomes.
Milbank Memorial Fund • www.milbank.org 3
•  Unlike the federal authorities that review anti-trust matters, states have multiple 
roles in overseeing their health care systems. In addition to scrutinizing anti-trust 
concerns, states are also trying to address hospital closures (particularly in rural 
areas) and making new investments in population health. A COPA provides a  
comprehensive way to address these issues.
•  A COPA requires a balance between collaboration and regulation. States and health 
systems need to establish a different relationship blending old and new roles. Is the 
result of this new relationship an innovative partnership or does it produce conflict 
and confusion?
•  Finally, as illustrated in the report, patients and providers cross state lines—so  
might oversight standards. When mergers stretch across state boundaries, it can  
be challenging to mesh pre-existing state laws created over different time frames.  
By adopting similar COPA laws, two states could more readily coordinate their review 
and oversight. 
State officials will continue to entertain requests from providers to consolidate. A portion 
of these would create organizations with great economic leverage and concomitant  
community responsibilities. While it is too early to tell what will happen as a result of the 
Tennessee-Virginia COPA decisions, state health policymakers and others interested in  
this field can learn from what has transpired there so far.
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Executive Summary  
Rapid health care consolidation has led to rising health care prices, diminished access 
to care, and reduced incentives for quality improvement. States have a variety of tools to 
address these adverse consequences of the loss of health care competition, ranging from 
state antitrust enforcement to global budgets or provider rate regulation.1 One of the tools 
is a “certificate of public advantage” (COPA), or cooperative agreement, under which the 
state approves a health care merger and shields it from antitrust enforcement in exchange 
for state oversight and supervision of the merged entities’ conduct. COPAs are controver-
sial. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and economists vehemently oppose COPAs, 
citing evidence that health care consolidation leads to higher prices and does not yield  
efficiencies, savings, or improved quality. The risks of COPAs are that they create, in es-
sence, a state-sanctioned monopoly that could significantly raise prices, reduce consumer 
choice and access, and disinvest in essential services that may be less profitable but are 
critical for population health. Nevertheless, particularly in rural areas, health care  
providers seek to consolidate to weather mounting financial challenges. In response,  
states are exploring COPAs as a tool to exercise oversight over the merging parties’ health 
care prices, secure commitments for investments in population health, promote beneficial 
health care integration, and maintain access to rural health care providers. 
This report describes the twin COPAs approved by Tennessee and Virginia in 2017 to allow 
health systems, Wellmont Health System and Mountain States Health Alliance, to merge 
to form Ballad Health System, a combined entity that holds a near-monopoly in southwest 
Virginia and northeast Tennessee. This report highlights the unique features of the Ballad 
Health COPA, involving two states’ COPA laws, and describes the legal authority, factors 
and commitments secured for approval, and the states’ resources and coordination for  
ongoing supervision. It remains to be seen whether the states can implement the COPAs 
with sufficient rigor and oversight to ensure the benefits of COPAs outweigh their risks. 
Several key observations emerge from the Tennessee-Virginia COPA:
• COPAs are resource-intensive. Sufficient resources are essential for states to have the 
capacity to engage in the rigorous review, approval, and ongoing oversight necessary 
for a COPA to meet legal requirements and to constrain the merger’s anticompetitive 
harms. Tennessee’s and Virginia’s laws illustrate the importance of being able to charge 
the merging parties for all the expenses of the state’s application review and oversight. 
• COPAs can be a tool to support population health and rural hospitals. COPAs may be most 
attractive to states under pressure from rural providers seeking mergers to improve 
their financial status. Meanwhile, states may view population health and maintenance 
of rural hospitals as the driving factor for approving a COPA. COPAs can provide states 
with leverage to secure binding commitments from private parties to invest in and 
assume responsibility for the region’s population health. States may be more interested 
in allowing consolidation among rural providers if the larger health system will support 
struggling rural hospitals and commit to maintaining the region’s access to key service 
lines. 
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• In a multi-state COPA, coordination is key. Tennessee and Virginia saw the importance of 
coordinating their review and oversight to avoid negative spillover effects on the other 
state. The health-related and financial fortunes of the region rise and fall together, 
so the importance of multi-state collaboration and oversight are critical. In addition, 
coordination is necessary to maintain consistency between the states’ conditions and 
measures for reporting. 
• States must balance specificity and flexibility in COPA conditions. The state needs to  
balance its desire for COPA specificity at the outset with flexibility to make needed 
adjustments in the future, all while guarding against efforts by the providers to dilute 
or avoid compliance with COPA conditions in ways that will harm the communities they 
serve. 
• States must define what a successful COPA looks like. States need to be able to assess, 
on an ongoing basis, whether a COPA is working as a policy matter. Some measures of 
success may include: (a) no closures of rural facilities; (b) maintenance or improvement 
of access to key health services; (c) increases in prices and overall health spending in 
line with comparable markets with more competition; (d) population health improve-
ment among key metrics; and (e) clinical integration via common electronic health 
records, IT infrastructure, common clinical standards, and regionalization of clinical 
services. Failure on any of these global measures of COPA performance should trigger 
an assessment of whether the COPA conditions should be adjusted, whether the state 
needs to do more to meet its oversight and enforcement obligations, or whether the 
COPA should be terminated. 
• COPAs are risky, and states must remain vigilant. States that pursue COPAs face  
several risks and challenges. First, the COPA party will have strong incentives to  
escape stringent regulatory oversight under the COPA. Second, once a merger is 
consummated, it is extremely difficult to “unscramble the eggs” and force a separa-
tion that restores competition among the parties, underscoring the importance of a 
detailed and updated plan of separation to try to maintain structural separation as a 
viable remedy. Third, when the state grants a monopoly, it is embarking on a long-term 
commitment to supervision and must budget for the resources and capacity to engage 
in rigorous oversight in perpetuity. Fourth, states must collect robust data on prices, 
access, population health, and quality to fulfill their statutory duties of ensuring the 
COPA offers a continued net public benefit while constraining the negative effects of 
consolidation. Finally, even with rigorous oversight the entity may not be financially 
sustainable, posing the risk that conditions will be worse, not better, than before the 
merger.
In sum, COPAs are a risky policy solution because they permit health care mergers  
that would not pass antitrust scrutiny and may result in untenable price increases and 
other adverse effects. On the other hand, COPAs may offer potential benefits in terms 
of population health and access particularly for struggling rural communities. Stringent, 
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well-resourced, and long-term state oversight is key to avoiding the risks of monopoly and 
enforcing the commitments to population health and cost control. Whether states can  
prevent the adverse outcomes and reap the potential benefits under a COPA remains an 
open question, but Tennessee and Virginia are poised to try.
I. Introduction 
States face critical financial challenges from rising health care costs and population  
health challenges in rural areas. Rising health care costs strain state budgets and squeeze 
resources of businesses and individuals, while rural areas struggle to maintain health  
facilities and access to providers.2 States are seeking tools to control rising health care 
costs while simultaneously supporting rural health care providers, which are often the  
largest employers as well as the source of health care services in the region. 
Meanwhile, health care payment reforms have spurred a wave of industry consolidation. 
Providers argue that consolidation is necessary to achieve the scale and scope needed to 
assume greater financial risk in the shift to value-based payment, to invest in information 
technology infrastructure, and to take on population health improvement. As a result of 
widespread consolidation, hospital market concentration in the United States has increased 
by 40% in the past 30 years.3 No hospital market in the United States remains “highly 
competitive,” nearly half of all hospital markets in the nation are “highly concentrated,” 
and most rural areas struggle to support even one major health care provider, let alone  
multiple competitors.4 As competition diminishes, prices rise because monopoly providers 
are able to negotiate with payers on an all-or-nothing basis, and payers lose the ability to 
walk away from negotiations with dominant providers when building their provider  
networks.
Health care consolidation is frequently justified by the potential of integration to improve 
health care quality and efficiency.5 There is a difference, however, between integration and 
consolidation. Health care integration occurs when disparate providers become connected 
clinically, via common electronic health records and shared clinical standards, to coordi-
nate care for a given population of patients. Consolidation involves combining disparate 
providers and suppliers under common corporate ownership through merger or acquisition, 
which often increases the market power of the combined entity when negotiating with pay-
ers or suppliers. And consolidation is not the only way to achieve health care integration. 
Independent providers may achieve many of the goals of integration—such as participating 
in a regional health information exchange or forming an accountable care organization—
through contractual agreement or joint venture, without corporate consolidation.6 
Not only are health care integration and consolidation not synonymous, but they also are  
often at odds with each other. Integration is often considered beneficial for improving  
patient care and reducing waste, whereas consolidation can generate market power that  
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increases prices and reduces consumer/patient welfare. Empirical evidence shows that 
health care market consolidation significantly increases prices without offsetting improve-
ments in quality or efficiency. Horizontal hospital consolidation leads to 20% to 40%  
higher prices, with greater price increases in concentrated markets.7 Monopoly hospitals 
have 12.5% higher prices than hospitals in markets with four or more competitors and are 
better able to resist risk-based contracts that shift financial risk from private payers to  
providers.8 Vertical acquisitions of physician practices by hospitals also leads to higher 
hospital prices, nearly 14% higher physician prices, and 10% to 20% higher total expen-
ditures per patient.9 Despite mounting evidence that consolidated providers raise prices, 
there is a lack of empirical data illustrating that integration improves quality or reliably 
generates cost savings through reduced utilization or improved efficiency, undercutting  
the usual justifications supporting consolidation.10 
In sum, health care markets are rapidly consolidating, and consolidated providers in 
concentrated markets raise prices without creating improvements in quality. Nevertheless, 
particularly in rural areas, states are also contending with the closure of rural hospitals,11 
bleak population health statistics, and unmet health needs exacerbated by the opioid 
epidemic. States are therefore seeking tools to allow health system integration to support 
their rural health care infrastructure and direct resources toward population health, while 
controlling the adverse effects of consolidation on health care costs, quality, and access. 
States have a variety of policy tools from which to choose to address rising health care 
costs, and COPAs are but one. These tools are highlighted in Box 1.
Box 1: States’ Policy Tools to Control Health Care Costs from Consolidation
• Market-based approaches: price transparency, reference pricing by state purchasers
• State antitrust enforcement: merger review, challenging anticompetitive mergers and 
practices
• Reducing barriers to entry for competitors: eliminating or amending certificates of 
need, expanding scope of practice laws, telehealth
• Certification and supervision of integrated providers: certificates of public advantage 
(COPAs), accountable care organization (ACO) certification
• Insurance regulation: strengthening insurance rate review, restricting anticompetitive 
contracting practices
• Rate oversight and regulation: rate oversight commission, rate caps, site-neutral pay-
ment, all-payer rate setting, global budgets
Source:  Erin C. Fuse Brown, State Strategies to Address Rising Health Care Costs 
Caused by Health Care Consolidation (Washington, DC: National Academy for State 
Health Policy, Sept. 2017), HTTP://nashp.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Consolida-
tion-Report.pdf. 
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Although COPAs are not without controversy, states may find them an attractive tool where 
struggling rural providers seek merger partners to avoid closure. In this context, states 
may look to COPAs to support rural providers, promote integration, control excessive price 
increases, and extract community investment from providers. States can facilitate clinical 
integration and retain oversight over a monopoly health system by immunizing merging 
health care entities from federal antitrust enforcement through use of state action immu-
nity. At least 13 states have legislative authority to immunize health care entities from 
antitrust enforcement—three via state action immunity and 10 via health-related COPAs.12 
In exchange for antitrust immunity, consolidating entities agree to ongoing oversight and 
restrictions of their potentially anticompetitive behavior, such as price increases, future 
acquisitions, or payer contracting practices. COPAs can be risky however. The FTC has  
expressed strong reservations about COPAs, raising concerns that rather than being  
necessary to encourage pro-competitive integration, the immunity will only “immunize 
precisely the types of conduct most likely to cause harm.”13
Although states may be considering COPAs to counteract the effects of health care  
consolidation, there are few historical examples to learn from. The three most recent ex-
amples of mergers approved under state COPAs were in Montana (Benefis Health System, 
1996), North Carolina (Mission Health, 1995), and West Virginia (Cabell Huntington/St. 
Mary’s, 2016). In a case study of the Mission Health COPA in North Carolina, the authors 
noted there was insufficient evidence whether that 20-year COPA effectively counteracted 
the loss of competition in the area, but they concluded that COPAs may be an underused 
resource to gain “light-handed, targeted” oversight over otherwise unregulated post- 
consolidation activities of integrated providers.14 Perhaps serving as a cautionary tale rather 
than as a model, in 2015 North Carolina rescinded its COPA statute, leaving the Mission 
Health system with monopoly power in the Asheville area, but without state oversight.15 
Similarly, Montana approved a merger pursuant to its COPA law, and then repealed the 
COPA law after 10 years, leaving the health system’s monopoly intact, but unsupervised.16 
In late 2017, Tennessee and Virginia approved the cooperative agreement allowing the 
merger of Wellmont Health System and Mountain States Health Alliance to form  
Ballad Health, a single health system that holds a near-monopoly in eastern Tennessee  
and southwestern Virginia. The Ballad Health COPA was unique for a couple of reasons. 
First, it was larger in scope than prior state COPAs, involving the merger of two health  
systems that included 19 hospitals across 21 counties in Tennessee and Virginia.17  
Second, the merger spanned two states, involving the approval and supervision of both 
states’ COPA requirements. Contrast this with a COPA allowing the merger of two hospitals 
within the same state.18 Tennessee’s and Virginia’s experience with Ballad Health supports 
the characterization of COPAs as “targeted,” but not “light-handed.” Indeed, for a COPA to 
be effective, particularly on the scale of the Ballad Health merger, it may require stringent 
state oversight of prices, quality, and access that resembles more extensive health care 
regulatory mechanisms.
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The COPAs in Tennessee and Virginia were driven by the merging parties, who were  
motivated by both financial and population health challenges. Like many rural providers,  
Wellmont faced financial challenges and struggled to maintain all its facilities. For  
example, in 2013 Wellmont closed and subsequently sold 70-bed Lee County Regional 
Medical Center in Pennington Gap, Virginia.19 Wellmont began seeking merger partners 
and settled on its main rival, Mountain States Health Alliance.20 At the time of the merger, 
neither Tennessee nor Virginia had expanded Medicaid, though Virginia’s General Assem-
bly voted in 2018 to approve Medicaid expansion.21 State expansion of Medicaid has 
been shown to improve the financial position of hospitals, reduce the rate of rural hospital 
closures, and improve access to health care among rural populations.22 The regions served 
by the two systems suffered significantly worse population health than state or national 
averages across a range of indicators, including smoking rates, obesity, neonatal opiate  
abstinence syndrome, preventable hospital stays, and primary care and mental health 
provider ratios.23 Against this backdrop, Wellmont and Mountain States negotiated a merger 
that would result in such a concentration of market power that the parties would need a 
COPA from both Tennessee and Virginia to avoid antitrust challenge by the FTC.24
This report examines a multi-state COPA allowing a merger-to-monopoly to form a large, 
multi-hospital health system spanning a largely rural or semirural area across two states. 
Part I introduces the environment in which the Tennessee and Virginia COPAs for Ballad 
Health occurred. Part II summarizes the states’ legal authority to approve the merger under 
their respective COPA/cooperative agreement laws. Part III describes the Ballad Health 
COPA application process, including how the application changed over time and the views 
of the FTC, the public, and other stakeholders submitted through public comments. Part IV 
details the bases for Tennessee’s and Virginia’s approvals of the Ballad Health COPA. Part V 
describes the roles, coordination, and resources of each state in the ongoing active supervi-
sion of the Ballad Health COPA. Part VI concludes with policy implications for other states 
considering COPAs as a tool for regulatory oversight of consolidating health care entities. 
II.  States’ Legal Authority to Issue COPAs   
The primary legal tool to prevent anticompetitive effects of consolidation are the antitrust 
laws. At the federal level, the FTC and the Department of Justice (DOJ) enforce the  
Clayton Act and the Sherman Act, federal antitrust laws that prohibit anticompetitive  
mergers, collaborations, and conduct.25 State attorneys general have parallel antitrust  
enforcement authority under federal and state antitrust laws to promote and protect  
competition from anticompetitive mergers or practices.26
States can shield otherwise anticompetitive mergers from antitrust enforcement through 
"state action immunity,” in which the challenged conduct is taken pursuant to “a clearly 
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy” and is “actively supervised by the 
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state.”27 To grant state action immunity for a merger, the state must use a detailed  
regulatory process that assesses whether the benefits of the merger outweigh the harms 
resulting from the loss of competition.28 This regulatory process is established through 
laws allowing states to assess the proposed cooperative agreement and grant a COPA to 
immunize the health care merger from federal antitrust scrutiny in exchange for contin-
ued oversight over the merging entity’s actions, particularly its prices, but also its quality, 
accessibility, utilization, and population and community health improvements. 
Although there are many similarities between Tennessee’s and Virginia’s legal authority to 
approve and oversee COPAs, there are some key differences, set forth in Table 1. 
Table 1. Comparison of Tennessee and Virginia COPA Authority
Legal Authority Tennessee (TN) Virginia (VA)
What the merger approval is 
called
COPA Cooperative agreement
Scope of COPA authority All of TN Southwest VA only
Reviewing and approving 
officials/agencies
One level of review: commis-
sioner of Tennessee Depart-
ment of Health (TDH)
Two levels of review: South-
west VA Health Authority 
makes a recommendation, 
commissioner of VA De-
partment of Health (VDH) 
makes an independent 
determination of approval
State attorney general’s  
(AG) role
TDH commissioner  
required to obtain TN AG’s 
agreement to approve
TN AG actively involved in 
review
VDH commissioner required 
to consult with VA AG, but 
little coordination in review
Whether agency can accept 
confidential submissions 
from applicants
TDH is unable to accept  
confidential submissions
TN AG can accept confiden-
tial information
VDH can accept confidential 
submissions
Standard for approval Clear and convincing  
evidence
Preponderance of evidence
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Criteria for review TDH to consider “other 
benefits”
(See Table 2.)
VDH to consider participa-
tion in Medicaid programs, 
total cost of care
(See Table 2.) 
Legal Authority Tennessee (TN) Virginia (VA)
Conditions for approval TDH’s conditions for ap-
proval are subject to agree-
ment between TDH and the 
parties
VDH commissioner may 
condition approval on  
applicants’ commitments to 
achieving specified improve-
ments in population health, 
access to health care 
services, quality, and cost 
efficiencies.
Form of approval Terms of certification, 
structured like a contract, 
subject to COPA parties’ 
agreement
Order, structured like a 
consent decree; conditions 
not subject to agreement by 
the parties
Oversight authority TDH and TN AG VDH commissioner
Entity charged with  
oversight 
COPA monitor (private  
contractor)
VDH staff
Enforcement authority TDH, TN AG (each has inde-
pendent authority to enforce 
COPA)
Penalties/remedies: Seek 
modification of COPA with 
parties’ consent, limit pay-
ment of executive incentive 
compensation, impose fines, 
termination
VDH commissioner only
Remedies: Seek modifica-
tion of cooperative agree-
ment with consent of the 
parties, termination
Fees for review and ongoing 
oversight
COPA applicants responsible 
for all costs of TDH and TN 
AG review and ongoing  
supervision, including  
outside consultants and 
experts
At the time of approval 
(2017), VDH only able to 
charge applicants $75,000 
for review and up to 
$75,000 annually for ongo-
ing supervision
In 2018, VA passed a law 
allowing VDH to charge 
COPA parties for all rea-
sonable costs of review and 
ongoing supervision, includ-
ing outside consultants and 
experts
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A. Tennessee  
Tennessee law29 permits the state to issue a COPA to “displace competition among hospi-
tals with regulation … and actively supervise that regulation … to promote cooperation and 
coordination among hospitals in the provision of health services and to provide state action 
immunity from federal and state antitrust law … to those hospitals issued a certificate of 
public advantage.”30
To obtain a COPA, the merging hospitals must submit an application to the Tennessee 
Department of Health (TDH) and state attorney general detailing the terms of the merger 
agreement, called a “cooperative agreement,” as well as supplemental materials about the 
parties’ financials, service areas, payer contracts, and other documentation addressing the 
COPA criteria.31 TDH reviews the application, conducts public hearings, and consults with 
and obtains the agreement of the attorney general to determine whether to approve the 
application and issue the COPA. 
Tennessee’s COPA application requirements are extensive, including submission of the 
parties’ signed cooperative agreement, financial statements, budgets, and detailed descrip-
tions of its service areas, costs, policies, and how the parties anticipate meeting require-
ments for access, quality, costs, savings, and efficiencies.32 Of note, the applicant must 
submit and annually update its plan of separation.33 One of the main critiques of COPAs 
is that it is difficult to undo a consummated merger for practical and regulatory reasons, 
even if it fails to generate the anticipated advantages (efficiencies, savings, or quality) or 
worse, if it allows the entity to raise prices and reduce access to or availability of services.34 
Owing to the difficulty of “unscrambling the eggs,” the COPA application’s requirement 
of a detailed and updated plan of separation attempts to maintain as a viable option the 
return of the parties to a separated state in the event of the termination of the COPA, like a 
prenuptial agreement for the merger. 
After consulting with and gaining agreement from the state attorney general, TDH may 
issue the COPA if it determines that the applicants have “demonstrated by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the likely benefits resulting from the Cooperative Agreement outweigh 
any disadvantages attributable to a reduction in competition that may result from the 
Cooperative Agreement.”35 To make its determination, TDH must evaluate certain enumer-
ated benefits and disadvantages. Table 2 describes the statutory criteria for Tennessee and 
Virginia.36
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Table 2. Statutory Criteria for COPA in Tennessee and Virginia
Benefits Disadvantages
1.  Enhancement of the quality of hospital 
and hospital-related care provided to 
[the state’s] citizens
The extent of any likely adverse impact on 
the ability of…payors to negotiate appropri-
ate payment and service arrangements with 
hospitals, physicians, allied health care 
professionals, or other health care providers
2.  Preservation of hospital facilities in  
geographical proximity to the  
communities traditionally served  
by those facilities
The extent of any reduction in competition 
among physicians, allied health professionals, 
other health care providers, or other per-
sons furnishing goods or services to, or in 
competition with, hospitals that is likely to 
result directly or indirectly from the cooper-
ative agreement
3.  Gains in the cost efficiency of services 
provided by the hospitals involved
The extent of any likely adverse impact on 
patients in the quality, availability, and price 
of health care services
4.  Improvements in utilization of hospital 
resources and equipment
The availability of arrangements that are less 
restrictive to competition and achieve the 
same benefits or a more favorable balance 
of benefits over disadvantages attributable 
to any reduction in competition likely to 
result from the agreement.
5.  Avoidance of duplication of hospital 
resources
6.  Demonstration of population health im-
provement of the region served according 
to criteria set forth in the agreement and 
approved by the department
7.  Any other benefits that may be identified 
(TN only)37
8.  Participation in state Medicaid program 
(VA only)
9. Total cost of care (VA only)
Source: Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-1303(e); Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-5384.1(E).
TDH must consult with the state attorney general to evaluate the effects of the reduction in 
competition from the proposed merger and obtain agreement from the attorney general to 
issue a COPA.38 Unlike TDH, the attorney general’s office may accept confidential submis-
sions relating to the COPA, which was useful in the case of the Ballad Health application 
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to gather competitively sensitive information from the merging parties. This may lead to 
greater involvement of the attorney general’s office in all phases of review. For the Ballad 
Health application, the attorney general’s office was heavily involved from the outset as part 
of the team reviewing the application for competitive, economic, and regional effects of the 
proposed merger. TDH may (but does not have to) consult with federal antitrust enforce-
ment agencies.39 TDH also met with and solicited comments from FTC officials as part of 
its review of the Ballad Health COPA application. 
After a COPA is issued, TDH must review the COPA at least annually to determine whether 
the likely benefits of the COPA are outweighed by the disadvantages from the reduction in 
competition.40 If it makes such a determination, TDH may seek a modification from the 
parties or terminate the COPA. Termination of the COPA would trigger the obligation of the 
health care entity to complete its plan of separation. Upon termination of the COPA, the 
state supervision required for state action immunity would no longer exist, and the parties 
could be subject to antitrust enforcement.41 
B. Virginia   
Clearing a path for the merger of Wellmont and Mountain States, Virginia enacted a law in 
2015 authorizing the Virginia health commissioner to approve health care mergers under 
a cooperative agreement among facilities serving citizens in the Southwest Virginia Health 
Authority (authority).42 Although the Virginia law does not use the term “certificate of pub-
lic advantage,” the effect of approval of the cooperative agreement is the same: it shields 
the merger from antitrust scrutiny through the application of state action immunity.43 It 
differs from the Tennessee COPA law in that the availability of a cooperative agreement is 
limited to mergers among health facilities in a particular region of southwest Virginia.44 
Health care entities in southwest Virginia submit an application for approval of their pro-
posed cooperative agreement to the authority, which provides copies of the application to 
the commissioner and the Virginia attorney general.45 Virginia’s application requirements 
are similar to the requirements in Tennessee.46 Nevertheless, there are some differences, 
such as Virginia’s requirements for information on employed physicians, potential market 
entrants, top 10 commercial payers, and a description of the applicants’ commitments to 
address any adverse impacts of the merger, including proposed metrics and consequences 
for failing to satisfy the commitment.47 
In Virginia, the decision whether to approve a cooperative agreement rests with the  
commissioner of the Virginia Department of Health (VDH). As a preliminary matter, the  
authority reviews the application and makes a recommendation to the commissioner.48 
After reviewing the authority’s recommendation and the administrative record, and after 
consultation with the state attorney general, the commissioner “shall approve” the co-
operative agreement if he or she independently finds that the benefits of the cooperative 
agreement outweigh the disadvantages from the reduction of competition.49 To make the 
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determination, the commissioner considers a list of enumerated benefits and disadvantages 
that largely mirror those in Tennessee (see Table 2).50
The main differences from Tennessee’s criteria for approval are, first, Virginia requires  
consideration of benefits to Medicaid participation and the total cost of care, while  
Tennessee allows the department to identify “other benefits.” Second, Tennessee requires 
TDH to makes its determination based on “clear and convincing evidence” while Virginia’s 
law requires the commissioner to make a determination by a lower “preponderance of the 
evidence” standard.51 Third, the Virginia health commissioner may condition approval of 
the cooperative agreement upon the applicants’ commitments to achieving specified  
improvements in population health, access to health care services, quality, and cost  
efficiencies.52 Tennessee’s terms and conditions for approval are subject to agreement  
between TDH and the parties.53 Before granting the COPA, the parties and TDH must  
agree on terms of certification and specific conditions that assure the public advantage.
Virginia’s process of review also differs from Tennessee’s. Virginia prescribes two levels of 
review: first by the authority and then by the commissioner. In the case of Ballad Health, 
the Virginia attorney general’s office was less involved in VDH’s review of the application 
than Tennessee’s attorney general. Tennessee law requires the attorney general’s agreement 
for TDH to approve a COPA, which in practice meant that Tennessee’s attorney general was 
intimately involved in the review from the start. Virginia’s commissioner must consult with 
the state attorney general but does not have to obtain attorney general approval. In  
practice, this meant that the Virginia attorney general’s office conducted its review  
independently of the commissioner’s office.54 Third, unlike Tennessee, where all submis-
sion materials are subject to state open records requirements, Virginia’s authority and 
commissioner may accept confidential information from the applicants and make public 
redacted versions, which may facilitate in-depth economic review of competitively sensitive 
information without having to go through the state attorney general’s office. 
III. Application Process of the Ballad Health COPA  
The states’ processes for reviewing the Ballad Health COPA application were both  
resource-intensive and procedurally robust. This part describes the application process  
and time line, the ways the application changed between initial submission and approval, 
and the public comments and expert views considered. 
A. Application Process and Timeline  
Wellmont Health System and Mountain States Health Alliance submitted their application 
for state approval to form Ballad Health via cooperative agreement to the TDH and the 
Southwest Virginia Health Authority on February 16, 2016. 
Over the following 19 months, TDH requested and received supplemental information 
from the parties at least three times before TDH determined the application complete on 
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May 22, 2017.55 TDH held six public hearings and received 15 written public comments 
(including three comment letters from FTC staff)56 before approving the COPA application 
on September 19, 2017.57 
In Virginia, the authority evaluated the application, conducted a joint public hearing with 
VDH, received public comments, and recommended to the VDH commissioner that the  
Ballad Health cooperative agreement be approved on November 22, 2016.58 The com-
missioner requested supplemental information twice and met with the parties three 
times, followed by additional requests for data.59 After Tennessee approved the COPA on 
September 19, 2017, the applicants submitted revised commitments to the authority in 
Virginia, which provided the commissioner with its feedback on October 16, 2017.60 The 
Virginia attorney general provided a letter of consultation to the commissioner on October 
23, 2017.61 The commissioner issued an order approving the cooperative agreement on 
October 30, 2017, accompanied by a report containing VDH staff analysis, the applicants’ 
revised commitments, and the commissioner’s conditions for approval.62 
Several months into the application review process, TDH and VDH officials and staff  
involved with the COPA review began collaborating in earnest, including weekly conference 
calls. Although each state had its own independent duties to evaluate the Ballad Health 
COPA application, the states found that close coordination enabled more efficient review 
and allowed the agencies to share information and expert analyses and refine questions 
for the applicants. This collaboration also benefited the applicants in terms of streamlin-
ing information submissions, avoiding duplicative or conflicting information requests, and 
creating a more unified set of commitments, measures, and reporting requirements for 
ongoing oversight. The states anticipate continuing to collaborate closely to supervise the 
COPA, evaluate compliance with legal requirements and conditions, and monitor the public 
advantage of the Ballad Health merger.
The close collaboration between the states proved critical to the timing of the COPA  
approvals. Once Tennessee approved the COPA, a great deal of pressure mounted for Virginia 
to announce its decision, which it did a little more than a month later. Before announce-
ment of Virginia’s decision, there was substantial concern that if Virginia did not approve 
the cooperative agreement, then Ballad Health would continue with the merger among  
Tennessee facilities but divest the Virginia facilities, which could leave these facilities 
without the level of state oversight provided by a COPA or the financial and administrative 
support of the rest of the Ballad Health system. The depth of coordination and information 
sharing between the states allowed both states’ concerns to be addressed and reduced the 
risk that the states would reach differing conclusions about approval, which could have left 
the region in a worse position than had both states approved or disapproved the COPA. 
The differences between the states’ form of approval—terms of certification versus order 
and conditions—highlights the unique regulatory character of a COPA approval. COPA  
approvals may resemble an adjudicatory process akin to a consent decree as well as a 
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negotiated agreement. When the state’s approval and conditions take the form of an agree-
ment, the COPA parties may believe they have more ability to negotiate with the state COPA 
authorities over these terms. Virginia’s structuring of its approval decision as an “order” 
with discretion to impose conditions63 allows the commissioner broader authority to dictate 
the terms of the approval than Tennessee’s “terms of certification” and requirement to 
obtain the parties’ agreement to the COPA terms, which are structured like a contract and 
lead parties to approach the state as another counterparty to the merger with which it is 
negotiating.64
B.  Application Changes from Initial Proposal to Final Approved Version 
The Ballad Health COPA application was voluminous at the outset65 but was nonetheless 
inadequately detailed to satisfy the states’ requirements for review. Both states issued  
several requests for supplemental information, and most of these requests were aimed 
at soliciting more detailed information to assess competitive, economic, and service-line 
effects of the proposed merger, including financial projections, more specific financial 
commitments, details on the parties’ employees and health plan contracts, and proposed 
continued uses and service lines of the merging facilities. Thus, the application evolved 
over time to become progressively more detailed and more specific.66
The application and the parties’ commitments also evolved substantively. For example,  
the parties’ proposal to limit the price effects of Ballad Health’s monopoly power on private 
health plans expanded and became more stringent from the initial application to its final 
approved commitments.67 In response to the parties’ amended price commitments, VDH 
staff noted, “The New Health System has committed to significant limitations, beyond what 
it initially proposed, on its ability to increase the prices it charges to payers.”68 Initially, the 
applicants had proposed to reduce its private rate increases by 50% in the first year after 
the merger and then limit future price increases to the Consumer Price Index (CPI)-hospi-
tals minus 0.25% for hospital services and CPI-medical minus 0.25% for physicians and 
outpatient services.69 In its final commitments, the parties agreed to limit price increases 
to the latest Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Medicare Market basket 
amount plus 0.25%.70 The initial application proposed limiting rate increases only for 
“principal payers,” defined as commercial payers that make up more than 2% of the new 
health system’s total net revenues.71 The final approved commitments applied price  
limitations to all payers, including small commercial payers, Medicare Advantage, and 
Medicaid payers.72
The second example was the parties’ financial commitments to invest sums toward  
expanded access to health services, population health improvement, graduate medical  
education, and a regional health information exchange. Initially, the parties’ application 
proposed to use anticipated cost savings to fund these health-related investments.73  
Although the total financial commitments ($308 million) were unchanged in the final  
approved version, the nature of the financial commitments became more specific, and, 
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significantly, the final commitments were not contingent upon the parties generating cost 
savings from the merger.74 
A third example was that population health outcomes were initially to be based solely on 
the parties’ own patients rather than the broader population of residents in the geographic 
area. In the final agreement approved by Tennessee, the population health measures are to 
be based on the entire population in the geographic service area covered by the cooperative 
agreement.75
In all of these instances, the states insisted upon more stringent conditions for the merging 
parties and a greater benefit to the population as a whole. 
C. Expert Views and Public Comments  
Both states received public comments from governmental organizations, economists,  
community groups, and members of the general public. This section highlights the  
concerns of some of the commenters, particularly the views of the FTC, academic experts 
and economists, health plans, and community stakeholder groups.
1. Views of the Federal Trade Commission  
The FTC submitted three comments to TDH and VDH regarding the COPA application 
based on a year-long assessment of the Ballad Health merger.76 The FTC comments were 
highly detailed and totaled more than 170 pages. In sum, the FTC’s position was this: “If 
the COPA is approved, the harm resulting from the reduction in competition is likely to 
far outweigh any potential benefits. In our view, the evidence put forward by the parties in 
their COPA application falls far short of the ‘clear and convincing’ standard they must meet 
pursuant to the Tennessee Hospital Cooperation Act. Consequently, we urge the Depart-
ment not to approve the COPA.”77 To support its conclusion, the FTC made the following 
arguments. 
First, the FTC provided quantitative evidence that Wellmont and Mountain States are each 
other’s closest competitors, and allowing them to merge would result in a near-monopoly 
in inpatient and certain outpatient services in the area.78 The level of concentration after 
merger would be so high as to create a “presumption of illegality.”79 This reduction in  
competition would lead to higher prices, reduced competition, reduced incentives for  
quality, and worse accessibility and availability of services.80 Competition between the 
merging parties has previously created incentives for the parties to compete for patients 
based on quality and service lines, and “the threat of losing patients and physician  
referrals to a rival system incentivizes each system to provide the best possible quality and 
patient experience.”81 
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Second, the FTC was highly skeptical of the parties’ claimed benefits from the COPA, 
noting that they would not outweigh the merger’s likely disadvantages. The FTC noted that 
many of the investments in health information exchange or electronic health records and 
community or population health initiatives could be achieved with contractual arrange-
ments and joint ventures less harmful to competition. 
Third, the FTC was doubtful that the parties’ proposed commitments would mitigate the 
harmful effects of the merger. For example, the FTC noted that the parties’ initial commit-
ments to make community investments were contingent on the applicants achieving their 
cost-saving targets.82 FTC staff also noted that price and quality commitments are difficult 
to administer and enforce.83 In addition, the FTC pointed out weaknesses in the parties’ 
commitments that would undermine their effectiveness: the commitment to maintain 
operation of rural hospitals is only effective for five years; the price caps for private pay-
ers would not apply to value-based or risk-based contracts; and the exclusion of payers 
with less than 2% of the health system’s net revenues would exempt 200 payers from the 
system’s price commitments.84 Some of these concerns were addressed in the final set of 
conditions imposed by the states.
Fourth, the FTC noted that the parties’ proposed plan of separation would not be an  
effective remedy to restore competition in the event of the termination of the COPA. Noting 
the practical difficulties of unwinding consummated mergers, or “unscrambling the eggs,” 
the FTC was concerned that the parties’ proposed plan of separation was inadequate, 
instead simply proposing a process to develop a plan of separation based on the market 
conditions at the time, which would not meaningfully restore a pre-consolidation state of 
competition.85
Finally, the FTC noted the challenges that other states have faced “regulating a hospital 
monopoly in perpetuity” under state COPAs. It highlighted how legislative repeal of North 
Carolina’s and Montana’s COPA laws meant that hospital monopolies approved in those 
states under a COPA were now virtually unregulated.86 
In addition to advising the rejection of the COPA application, the FTC’s comments and 
analyses served another important role: they signaled to the COPA applicants that the FTC 
could and perhaps would likely pursue enforcement to block or seek to unwind the merger 
in the absence of the COPA. The unfavorable views of the FTC, though at odds with the 
states’ ultimate approvals of the COPA, actually strengthened the hand of the states. The 
threat of FTC antitrust enforcement can motivate the parties to accept and comply with the 
state COPA authorities’ stringent conditions for approving the COPA, because if the states 
disapprove the COPA, then the FTC has indicated it would block the proposed merger. The 
FTC’s concerns also highlight the importance of stringent state oversight in perpetuity and 
the maintenance of a detailed and viable plan of separation. 
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Despite the FTC’s disagreement with the ultimate approval of the COPAs, the states  
actively sought the FTC’s input in their review. Viewing the FTC as a partner and a resource, 
particularly for an economic and market-based analysis of the merger’s competitive effects, 
allowed the states to seek additional refinements to the conditions imposed on the COPA 
parties. 
2. Views of Academic Economists and Health Insurance Plans  
The views of the FTC were echoed in the comments submitted by academic experts,  
economists, and health insurance plans.87 Most of the economists who submitted  
comments urged the states to reject the COPA application, citing evidence that hospital 
mergers lead to higher prices and reductions or lack of improvements in quality. The  
economists expressed doubt that the states could effectively monitor or enforce post- 
merger conduct after granting the Ballad Health monopoly, due to the complexity, resource 
intensity, and difficulty calculating and updating performance measures.88 
TDH also received comments from representatives of health insurance plans, trade group 
America’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP), and health plans Amerigroup and Anthem Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of Virginia. AHIP commissioned an economic analysis to assess the 
competitive impact of the merger of the parties’ acute care hospitals.89 AHIP’s experts 
concluded that the merger is likely to “significantly reduce competition and raise prices for 
consumers,” consistent with the findings of the FTC.90 Amerigroup is a health plan offering 
Medicare Advantage and Medicaid managed care plans to approximately 400,000 indi-
viduals in Tennessee, including residents in the area affected by the merger. Amerigroup 
similarly objected to the Ballad Health merger, arguing that the parties understated the 
competitive risks of the merger and that their proposed commitments would not result in 
the claimed benefits.91 In particular, it expressed concern that the parties’ initial price  
limitations did not apply to Medicare Advantage or Medicaid managed care payers.92  
Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield of Virginia submitted a similar comment to the authority  
in Virginia93 and argued that the merger “would result in a monopoly hospital system…and 
even the oversight proposed by this Cooperative Agreement Application would be  
inadequate to ensure low prices and high quality health care in southwest Virginia.”94
3. Views of Community Stakeholder Groups  
TDH received comments from the Bristol, Johnson City, and Kingsport chambers of com-
merce urging approval of the merger, citing concerns that allowing either applicant to 
merge with other entities would lead to higher prices and greater loss of jobs in the area.95 
The Holston Medical Group, a large, multispecialty group serving the area, also supported 
approval of the merger “if properly regulated” due to investments in the regional health 
information exchange and limits on physician employment.96 Most of the individuals who 
commented, however, expressed opposition to the merger, citing the adverse effects on 
consumers’ health care prices, choices, and access in the area.97 
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IV. Bases for Approval  
Tennessee issued a letter approving the Ballad Health COPA on September 19, 2017,98 
and Virginia approved the cooperative agreement a little more than a month later, on  
October 30, 2017.99 In their letters of approval, both Tennessee and Virginia cited the 
bleak population health statistics, regional economic factors, and health care delivery  
system challenges in the geographic area served by the merging health systems. Noting 
that competition between Wellmont and Mountain States was not resulting in meaningful 
health benefits in terms of access or health outcomes, the commissioners in each state 
viewed the COPA process as a vehicle to secure substantial commitments from Ballad 
Health for population health improvements, infrastructure and workforce investments, and 
keeping key hospital facilities open.100 
The commissioners of Tennessee and Virginia provided the following assessments of each 
of the statutory criteria for assessing whether the benefits of the cooperative agreement  
outweigh the disadvantages, i.e., whether there is a net public advantage to the merger 
with state oversight.101 
A. Quality    
Tennessee noted the mixed evidence that hospital mergers improve quality, but concluded 
that with active supervision, quality would likely improve due to the parties’ commitments 
to specific quality reporting measures, a $150 million investment in a common clinical  
information technology platform, and formation of a physician-led clinical council.102  
Virginia further noted that benefits to quality would result from Ballad Health’s commit-
ments to establish risk-based payment models rewarding quality and value and to invest  
$8 million in a regional health information exchange.103
B. Preservation of Hospital Facilities   
Acknowledging the economic pressures facing rural hospitals, Tennessee concluded the 
benefit of preservation of hospitals was likely, given the applicants’ commitment to keep 
operating rural hospitals and offering key service lines for at least five years after closing, 
with ongoing commitments to continue operation of three primary acute care hospitals in 
the region.104 Virginia had a similar assessment and imposed further conditions on Ballad 
Health regarding the repurposing of hospitals and the maintenance of essential services in 
the affected areas.105
C. Cost Efficiency    
Tennessee noted that the parties’ projected savings from merger-related efficiencies ($366 
million over the first five years, $95 million in the subsequent five years) were merely esti-
mates, and that the FTC believed these efficiencies were unlikely. The state was unwilling 
to credit the parties these efficiency-based savings unless they were passed on to consum-
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ers in the form of lower prices and community reinvestments.106 To increase the likelihood 
of this benefit occurring, Tennessee and Virginia will collect pricing data to monitor wheth-
er such savings are in fact passed on to consumers. In addition, the states required the 
parties to fund a total of $308 million in community health investment over 10 years, and  
this commitment is not contingent upon the parties realizing cost savings. In other words, 
even if the parties failed to achieve the anticipated cost savings, Ballad Health is still obli-
gated to fully fund the community health investments, which include funding for initiatives 
to expand access, support research and graduate medical education, improve population 
health, and fund a regional health information exchange.107 
D. Utilization  
Tennessee and Virginia both concluded that the parties’ commitments to invest in a com-
mon clinical information technology platform and regional health information exchange 
will enable Ballad Health to reduce overutilization through better coordination of care and 
achievement of sufficient scale to engage in risk-based contracting with payers, including 
payments based on capitation, a percentage of premiums, accountable care arrangements, 
and quality-based payments.108 Virginia further required Ballad Health to enter into risk-
based contracts with an increasing proportion of its commercial payers by specified dead-
lines as well as value-based payment arrangements with Medicaid managed care organiza-
tions.109 
E. Avoidance of Duplication   
Tennessee did not take a position on whether the applicants’ cooperative agreement would 
avoid duplication of services, primarily because the goal of reducing duplication may be at 
odds with the goals of improving access and quality of care.110 Virginia similarly considered 
the avoidance of duplication to be a secondary benefit that was addressed by the parties’ 
commitments to maintain essential services if the merging parties decide to eliminate 
duplicative service lines.111 
F. Population Health Improvement    
Securing tangible commitments to population health improvement was a driving force 
behind both Tennessee’s and Virginia’s decisions to approve the Ballad Health COPA. 
Tennessee observed that the “ two health systems would not pursue population health 
improvement efforts to the necessary degree without the funding and incentives provided 
by the Cooperative Agreement and the issuance of the COPA.”112 These commitments 
included a financial commitment to invest $75 million over 10 years for population health 
improvement, establishing a department and a plan for population health improvement, 
and reporting to the states on performance on population health metrics.113 
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G. Other Benefits   
Both Tennessee and Virginia recognized several additional benefits that would result 
from the conditions imposed under the COPA. First are the benefits of improved access 
by medically underserved and low-income populations that could result from the parties’ 
commitments to maintain or expand their existing charity care policies to provide individ-
uals earning up to 400% of the federal poverty level with sliding-scale discounts or free 
services.114 Second is improved availability of services from the parties’ commitments 
to invest $140 million over 10 years to develop needed health care services, including 
$85 million for behavioral and substance abuse services, $27 million in children’s health 
services, and $28 million in rural health programs.115 Third are commitments to establish 
partnerships and expand investment of $85 million over 10 years in research and graduate 
medical education and training.116
An additional concern of the states’ governors and attorneys general was the impact of 
the Ballad Health merger on their workforces, including the potential loss of jobs from the 
merger and the downstream economic and health effects of reduced employment opportu-
nities in the region.117 The Ballad Health entities are among the largest employers in the 
area, so to mitigate adverse effects on the Ballad Health employees, the states’ conditions 
of approval contained employee protections, including a $70 million commitment over 10 
years to eliminate differences in pay and benefits among Ballad Health employees, prohibi-
tions on terminating rural hospital employees without cause for two years, and notification 
to TDH and VDH of any planned workforce reduction of more than 50 employees of rural 
hospitals or a closure or reduction of a service line in a rural hospital.118 
H. Medicaid (Virginia)    
As required by its statutory criteria, Virginia assessed the benefits of approving the cooper-
ative agreement to the state’s Medicaid program. Virginia concluded that its Medicaid pro-
gram would likely benefit from the applicants’ commitments to contract with all Medicaid 
managed care organizations, participate in the Addiction and Recovery Treatment Services 
Program, and implement value-based payment programs with Virginia Medicaid managed 
care plans.119 Although the FTC opined that the parties had not explained why a merger 
would be necessary to continue or expand participation in Medicaid, the VDH Staff Analysis 
and Report noted that the parties’ Medicaid commitments expand on existing commitments 
to participate in Medicaid programs.120
I.  Disadvantage: Impact on Payers’ Negotiated Rates, Total Cost  
of Care121 
Acknowledging that the reduction in competition from the merger and the parties’ substan-
tial resulting market share could lead to higher total costs, both states required the appli-
cants to commit to significant limitations on the ability to increase prices for commercial 
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payers and to continue to negotiate with and contract with these private payers.122 The  
limits on price increases to private payers was a critical requirement of both Tennessee’s 
and Virginia’s approvals: Ballad Health agreed not to increase hospital or physician rates 
more than the latest CMS-approved Medicare Market basket amount plus 0.25% (for a 
total of 2.95% in 2018).123 For payers that do not offer a quality component in their fee 
schedules, Ballad Health may add an additional 1.25% adjustment (up to 4.2% in 2018). 
To ensure compliance with these limits on price increases, both states require Ballad 
Health to annually report its price increases for payers, calculate the amounts that price 
increases exceed the amounts allowed under the cooperative agreement, and refund  
excess amounts to payers and patients.124 In addition, Ballad Health must reduce future 
payer rates to avoid receiving excess payments, taking into account the applicable inflation 
adjustment allowed under the cooperative agreement.125 
In addition to the limits on rate increases for private payers, the merging parties agreed to 
several conditions regarding their health plan contracting and billing practices:
  1. To negotiate in good faith with all payers in the service area; to not refuse to nego-
tiate with any new payers or payers with small market shares; to resolve disputes with 
plans through mediation and notify TDH and VDH of any disputes; and, if mediation is 
unsuccessful, to resolve disputes through “final offer arbitration.”126
  2. To refrain from bargaining for or insisting upon anti-tiering or anti-steering  
clauses.127
  3. To not engage in exclusive contracting with payers, including requiring that Ballad 
Health be the exclusive network provider to any payer as a condition of contracting 
with the payer;128 prohibiting any payer from contracting with other providers in the 
area; or prohibiting any payer from exclusively contracting with any affiliates of Ballad 
Health.129
  4. To not engage in “most-favored nation” pricing with any payer.130
  5. To not contract with payers on behalf of physicians, except for Integrated Solutions 
Health Network, LLC, or through a clinically integrated network agreement in compli-
ance with antitrust laws.131
  6. To limit out-of-network pricing and out-of-network balance billing of patients to two 
times the applicable hospital and physician inflation amounts for the first two years 
the system is out of network and to no more than the cooperative agreement’s inflation 
amounts thereafter.132
 7. To not own, operate, control, or license any health plan.133
Milbank Memorial Fund • www.milbank.org 25
J. Disadvantage: Reduced Competition Among Professionals  
Both Tennessee and Virginia recognized that approving the merger could harm competition 
among physicians and ancillary service providers and adversely affect vendors that fur-
nish goods and services to the merging hospitals. The concern is that a monopoly hospital 
system can control admitting and clinical privileges of independent physicians and control 
patient referrals within the health system and to ancillary, home, or outpatient providers.134 
To mitigate these harms to competition among physicians and other providers, the states 
imposed the following conditions on the merging health systems:
  1. It shall not require independent physicians to practice exclusively at its facilities  
or prohibit independent physicians from providing services outside of Ballad Health  
facilities.135 
  2. It shall not prohibit any independent physicians with privileges from participating  
in any health plans or provider networks.136
  3. It shall not engage in exclusive contracting for physician services, except for  
contracts for certain hospital-based physician specialties, for a term of less than  
three years, as approved by the Tennessee Department of Health137 or as determined  
by the Ballad Health board in Virginia.138
  4. It shall maintain an open medical staff at all its facilities139 and not restrict  
physicians’ ability to see their patients admitted to a Ballad Health facility.140 In  
addition, Tennessee requires Ballad Health to allow its independent physicians to 
obtain privileges at any other hospitals and competing networks without jeopardizing 
privileges at Ballad Health facilities.141
  5. Ballad Health shall not employ more than 35% of the physicians in any specialty, 
with exceptions for rural hospitals, hospital-based physicians, and exceptions approved 
by the Tennessee Department of Health.142 Only Tennessee requires this condition. 
  6.Tennessee prohibits Ballad Health from restricting the ability of vendors or  
suppliers from contracting with competitors or from requiring vendors to include 
“most-favored nation”  provisions in contracts.143
K. Disadvantage: Adverse Impact on Price, Quality, or Access  
Loss of competition between the health systems could threaten quality, increase prices, 
and reduce the availability of services because would-be competitors would no longer have 
to compete on quality or ensure services remain available to bargain for inclusion in health 
plan networks. Moreover, the increased market power of the combined entity can be used 
to demand substantially higher rates from payers, who can no longer build a viable provider 
network without Ballad Health.144 
To address these adverse impacts on consumers, patients, and payers, the states imposed 
several conditions on the applicants that have been discussed above,145 including  
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commitments (a) to continue operating key hospitals, rural hospitals, and essential  
services146; (b) to track and report on quality measures, subject to state supervision147; (c) 
to limit price increases for private payers148; and (d) to invest $140 million in expanded 
access to clinical services, including behavioral, children’s, and rural health services.149 In 
addition, as further mitigating factors, Virginia notes the applicants’ commitments to: (a) 
partner with the Virginia Medicaid program to implement value-based payment; (b) adopt a 
charity care policy that is more charitable than existing policies; and (c) include dental and 
vision services in Ballad Health’s Rural Health Services plan.150
L. Disadvantage: Availability of Less Restrictive Alternatives  
Both states observed that although it is possible that the benefits of the proposed coop-
erative agreement could be achieved through alternative arrangements less harmful to 
competition, the parties have failed to produce these benefits in the past.151 For example, 
Tennessee “question[ed] whether either health care system would actually pursue these 
benefits without the COPA, as they have not done so in the past.”152 In the end, both states 
concluded that the terms and conditions of the states’ COPA approvals tipped the  
balance of benefits and disadvantages in favor of approving the COPA, citing in particular 
the commitments to making substantial financial investments, improving population health, 
maintaining access to rural health facilities, and submitting to ongoing supervision.153
V. Ongoing Supervision and Oversight  
The COPA process does not end with approval, but rather enters a new phase of state  
oversight. As noted above, active supervision is the second requirement for state action 
immunity from antitrust enforcement. States that approve a COPA must provide ongoing  
supervision and oversight of the merged entities to ensure compliance with the conditions 
of the COPA and to monitor whether the merger’s benefits in fact outweigh the adverse 
effects of the loss of competition. 
In the case of Tennessee's and Virginia’s COPA/cooperative agreement laws, the obligation 
of oversight continues indefinitely, so long as the cooperative agreement remains approved. 
The COPAs do not expire by their own terms and could continue as long as the benefits of 
the cooperative agreement continue to outweigh the disadvantages.154 This part discusses 
the roles of each state agency to supervise the COPA and the resources necessary for the 
states to carry out their statutory oversight obligations.
A. The Roles of Each State Agency 
1. Tennessee  
Oversight entities. Tennessee’s COPA law entrusts the TDH and the state attorney  
general with “active and continuing oversight of all cooperative agreements.”155 This con-
tinued oversight entails, at minimum, annual review of the COPA to determine whether the 
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benefits of the cooperative agreement continue to outweigh the disadvantages from  
reductions in competition.156 In addition, TDH’s role includes reviewing the findings of the 
COPA monitor (described below), making a determination of the continued existence of a 
public advantage or lack thereof, seeking modification of the COPA, pursuing enforcement 
in coordination with the state attorney general, and terminating the COPA.157 Finally, the 
COPA entity must update its plan of separation at least annually, and TDH must hold a 
public hearing in the COPA service area at least once every three years while the COPA is  
in effect.158 
Tennessee’s terms of certification for the Ballad Health COPA created a variety of additional 
entities to monitor compliance with the COPA:159
  COPA compliance office, an internal office within Ballad Health that is the initial step for 
resolution of complaints of noncompliance with the COPA or terms of certification.
  COPA monitor, an independent entity or consultant retained by TDH to monitor Ballad 
Health’s COPA compliance and evaluate performance against the COPA performance 
index (discussed below). The COPA monitor’s duties include reviewing the health  
system’s reports, conducting audits, making recommendations, and providing an  
annual report to TDH. The COPA monitor will conduct much of the work on the ongoing 
assessment of Ballad Health’s COPA compliance and performance. 
  Local advisory council, made up of eight to 10 community leaders who live in the area 
and facilitate input from residents of the service area.
Measures. Tennessee regulations require TDH to develop indices to evaluate the COPA’s 
performance and effects on population health; access to health care services; economic 
effects; and other benefits based on recommendations of an advisory group.160 The terms of 
certification of the Ballad Health COPA provides that TDH will use an index to track  
ongoing public advantage, which includes four sub-indices: (a) a population health 
sub-index; (b) an access sub-index; (c) an economic sub-index; and (d) another sub-index 
(measuring quality, patient satisfaction, medical research, and education). Each sub-in-
dex—except economic, which is pass-fail—is scored on a scale of 1 to 100, averaged, 
and weighted to calculate a final score for the year, which is used to evaluate whether the 
COPA offers a continuing public advantage.161 In its annual review, TDH reviews the health 
system’s final score for the various indices, the economic sub-index pass-fail grade, the 
degree of compliance with the terms of certification, and the health system’s trends in 
performance.162
Enforcement. If TDH determines that the benefits resulting from a COPA no longer  
outweigh the disadvantages attributable to the loss of competition resulting from the  
agreement, TDH may first seek modification of the agreement with the consent of the  
parties. If the modification is not obtained, TDH may terminate the COPA, subject to  
appeal by the COPA entity.163 The Ballad Health terms of certification describes the entity’s 
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obligation to notify TDH of material adverse events and noncompliance within 15 days and 
the corrective actions TDH can pursue, including prohibiting payment of bonuses or incen-
tive compensation to executives, paying fines (ranging from $10,000 to $1 million) to the 
Population Health Fund, and/or modifying or terminating the COPA.164 
The Tennessee attorney general has independent authority to commence investigation and 
enforcement actions of the COPA entity. The attorney general may subpoena witnesses and 
order the production of documents, seek an injunction of the COPA, and file suit to termi-
nate the COPA if it establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the benefits of the 
agreement and costs of canceling the agreement are outweighed by the disadvantages to 
competition attributable to the cooperative agreement.165 
2. Virginia   
Oversight entities. In Virginia, oversight over an approved cooperative agreement is entrusted  
to the commissioner of the Virginia Department of Health.166 Similar to Tennessee, the 
parties to the cooperative agreement must submit a report annually to the commissioner 
on compliance with the conditions to the cooperative agreement and information on its 
health care prices, costs, quality, and access to care.167 Unlike Tennessee’s COPA monitor, 
VDH staff will conduct most of the analysis and oversight within the department. Internal 
officials and staff at VDH will be charged with directing oversight, analyzing data, building 
information technology systems, surveying and inspecting facilities, and coordinating with 
the authority, Ballad Health, TDH staff, and TDH’s COPA monitor. 
Measures. In her letter of approval, the commissioner of the VDH announced she would 
establish quantitative measures within three months of approval, by January 31, 2018.168 
Virginia regulations call for the formation of a technical advisory panel to make recommen-
dations to VDH on measures of quality, cost, and access, and to objectively assess  
the benefits and disadvantages of the cooperative agreement.169 The commissioner has 
exclusive authority whether to adopt, add, modify, or reject recommendations from the 
technical advisory panel.170 In addition to these quantitative measures, the entity’s annual 
report must include: actions taken in relation to VDH’s conditions of approval or the parties’ 
commitments; changes in price, cost, quality, access, or population health status; financial 
information including actual costs, revenues, profits, and chargemaster (list prices);  
negotiated rates with nonphysician providers; and an updated plan of separation. All  
reports must be certified by a third-party auditor.171 
Enforcement. If the commissioner of the VDH has reason to believe that the cooperative 
agreement no longer meets the requirements of Virginia law or the order of approval and 
its conditions, the commissioner will initiate an administrative proceeding to determine 
compliance.172 Virginia’s order approving the cooperative agreement requires Ballad Health 
to notify the commissioner and the authority within 24 hours of any material adverse event 
or noncompliance with any of the conditions of the cooperative agreement.173  
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This is significantly shorter than Tennessee’s 15-day notice requirement. The commis-
sioner has authority to seek modification of the cooperative agreement with the consent 
of the parties to ensure compliance with the law, or the commissioner may revoke approv-
al of the cooperative agreement upon finding that: the parties or the agreement are not 
complying with the terms and conditions of approval; the benefits of the agreement no 
longer outweigh the disadvantages attributable to the reduction in competition resulting 
from the agreement; the commissioner’s approval was obtained based on an intentional 
misrepresentation or coercion of any party to the agreement; or the parties failed to pay 
required fees.174 Like any administrative action, the commissioner’s findings and decision 
are subject to judicial review. Unlike Tennessee, the Virginia attorney general does not have 
independent authority to investigate or enforce the cooperative agreement. 
3. Coordination Between States on Supervision   
Although each state has an independent statutory duty to engage in active, ongoing  
supervision of the COPA/cooperative agreement, Tennessee and Virginia have coordinated to 
develop a uniform or nearly identical set of metrics, particularly in terms of access to care, 
quality, and private payer pricing. There are some variations between the states in their 
metrics on population health and total costs of care, but they are similar overall. 
Key officials from both states’ health departments indicated that they planned to continue 
coordinating as they had during the COPA application process for ongoing supervision, 
including through periodic conference calls and information sharing.
As with the initial approval, there are risks to each state if their postures on ongoing 
approval and supervision of the COPA were to diverge. For example, if one state were to 
terminate its approval of the cooperative agreement, the parties to the merger would need 
to initiate the plan of separation, which could undermine the ability of the health system 
facilities and providers in the other state to continue to meet their commitments under 
that state’s terms of approval. Thus, officials from both states stressed the importance of 
ongoing communication and coordination to avoid the adverse effects of divergent state 
decisions on enforcement or ongoing approval. 
B. Resources for COPA Review and Ongoing Supervision  
Both the review and ongoing supervision of a COPA/cooperative agreement are extremely 
resource-intensive. States require extensive funding for staff time, public hearings, expert 
reports and analyses, data analytics, and information systems to engage in the thorough 
regulatory review and active supervision required for state action immunity. For instance, 
according to TDH staff, Tennessee’s costs to review the Ballad Health COPA application 
were $2,995,545. 
The fee structure set forth in a state’s COPA laws is critical to financing state COPA capac-
ity. For example, Tennessee’s COPA law provides that the parties to the COPA application 
are responsible for paying “all such costs” of TDH’s and the state attorney general’s review 
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of the COPA application, preparation of the COPA and terms of certification, and ongoing 
active supervision, including the costs of the COPA monitor, TDH staff, and experts and 
consultants retained.175 
By contrast, Virginia’s laws at the time the Ballad Health cooperative agreement was  
approved only permitted VDH to charge the applicants up to $75,000 for the department’s 
costs of reviewing an application.176 The limitation in resources available in Virginia com-
pared to Tennessee underscored the importance of resources and inter-state collaboration 
to minimize duplication. In practice, Virginia’s limited fee structure meant Tennessee had 
greater capacity to engage in its review. The Virginia rules in place at the time similarly lim-
ited the parties’ costs for ongoing annual review to $75,000.177 To overcome these resource 
constraints, in 2018 the Virginia General Assembly passed a bill that would lift these caps 
and allow VDH, like Tennessee, to charge all of the actual and reasonable costs of review, 
approval, and ongoing supervision to the parties to the cooperative agreement.178 The 
amended Virginia law also expressly authorizes the commissioner to contract with qualified 
experts and consultants to review applications for a cooperative agreement as well as for 
ongoing supervision and to charge the costs of such experts and consultants to the parties 
to the cooperative agreement.179 An estimate of VDH’s annual costs of ongoing supervision 
of the Ballad Health cooperative agreement was included in the governor’s proposed 2018 
budget, totaling $624,518 per year.180 
In a multi-state COPA, each state has an independent duty to review, approve, and conduct 
ongoing supervision, so while close coordination between the states can streamline the 
process for the COPA entities, the compliance and reporting costs are generally multiplied 
by the number of states involved to fund each state’s staff and resources involved in review 
and oversight. 
VI. Policy Implications for Other States  
The experiences of Tennessee and Virginia in reviewing the Ballad Health COPA have 
several implications for other states considering implementing or applying a COPA law to 
immunize health care mergers from antitrust enforcement in exchange for ongoing active 
supervision.
Importance of resources. Sufficient resources are essential for states to have the capacity 
to engage in the rigorous review, approval, and ongoing oversight necessary for a COPA to 
meet legal requirements and constrain the merger’s anticompetitive harms. Tennessee and 
Virginia provide a great example of the importance of being able to charge the merging par-
ties for all the expenses of the state’s application review and oversight. Tennessee’s greater 
capacity in this regard proved critical and led Virginia to amend its cooperative agreement 
law to allow a similar fee structure to enable the state to conduct the level of active, ongo-
ing supervision required under its law. 
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Population health and rural hospitals. Both Tennessee and Virginia saw their COPA authority 
as a vehicle to seek improvements to population health and maintain rural hospitals in the 
region affected by the COPA. The states may view population health as the driving factor 
for approving a COPA, where the state is granting a monopoly in exchange for extensive 
investments in population health and concrete commitments to maintain or expand essen-
tial hospitals, services, and infrastructure. In particular, the states will hold the monopoly 
provider accountable for the health outcomes of the entire population of the region, not 
just the patients served by its facilities. The concerns of the FTC and health economists 
underscored the importance of de-coupling these commitments from the realization of  
uncertain cost savings from the merger. The Ballad Health experience illustrates how  
COPAs can provide states with leverage to secure binding commitments from private parties 
to invest in and assume responsibility for the region’s population health. States may be 
more interested in allowing consolidation among rural providers if the larger health system 
will support struggling rural hospitals and commit to maintaining the region’s access to key 
service lines. 
In a multi-state COPA, coordination is key. Tennessee and Virginia saw the importance of  
coordinating their reviews and oversight to avoid negative spillover effects on the other 
state. For example, if Tennessee had approved and Virginia had not, the merging system 
would likely have divested its Virginia facilities, leaving these more vulnerable to closure, 
which in turn could harm residents in the region, drain health resources and investments 
from Virginia, and negatively affect employment at those facilities. The health-related and 
financial fortunes of the region rise and fall together, so multi-state collaboration and over-
sight are critical. In addition, coordination is necessary to maintain consistency between 
the states’ conditions and measures for reporting. 
Balancing specificity and flexibility in COPA conditions. States have many reasons to seek 
highly specific COPA conditions at approval due to statutory obligations to ensure their 
assessment of a net public advantage is adequately supported and to facilitate ongoing 
oversight and enforcement. The reality of ongoing oversight, however, may not match the 
specific conditions and measures initially set forth in the COPA approval, whether due to 
changing circumstances or inevitable course corrections. The process for ongoing oversight, 
therefore, needs to build in flexibility to reappraise, reassess, and adjust the COPA condi-
tions, measures, and targets in a dynamic way that can be sustained years into the future. 
Thus, the state needs to balance its desire for COPA specificity at the outset with flexibility 
to make adjustments in the future, all while guarding against efforts by the providers to 
dilute or avoid compliance with COPA conditions in ways that will harm the communities 
they serve. 
What a successful COPA looks like. Although empirical data on the effects of COPAs are 
lacking, states that endeavor to use a COPA as a health policy tool should assess wheth-
er the COPA is working, a critical task even years after the initial COPA approval. States 
should define what a successful COPA would look like. Some measures of success may 
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include: (a) no closures of rural facilities; (b) maintenance or improvement of access to key 
health services; (c) increases in prices and overall health spending in line with comparable 
markets with more competition; (d) population health improvement among key metrics; and 
(e) clinical integration via common electronic health records, IT infrastructure, common 
clinical standards, and regionalization of clinical services. Notably, COPA success depends 
on the performance of both the COPA providers and the state oversight authorities. Fail-
ure on any of these global measures of COPA performance should trigger reassessment of 
whether the COPA conditions should be adjusted, whether the state needs to do more to 
meet its oversight and enforcement obligations, or whether the COPA should be terminated. 
COPAs are risky, and states must remain vigilant. Despite the FTC’s objections, states may be 
considering COPAs as a tool to manage the ongoing wave of health care consolidation and 
seek population health improvements, particularly in rural areas. The FTC acknowledges 
that there is insufficient data and evidence to determine whether state-granted COPAs are 
capable of mitigating the adverse effects on price, quality, and availability of health care 
services from the loss of competition between the merging health care entities.181 The ex-
perience of other states’ COPAs illustrates some risks and challenges. First, the COPA party 
will have strong incentives to escape stringent regulatory oversight under the COPA, either 
through legislative repeal of the state’s COPA law or by seeking exceptions, modifications, 
or regulatory evasion from the COPA conditions.182 Second, once a merger is consummated, 
it may be extremely difficult to “unscramble the eggs” and force a separation that restores 
competition among the parties. This underscores the importance of states’ insistence on 
detailed and updated plans of separation to try to maintain structural separation as a viable 
remedy if the parties fail to comply. Third, states must understand that when the state 
grants a monopoly, it is embarking on a long-term commitment to supervision and must 
plan and budget for the resources and capacity to engage in rigorous oversight in perpetu-
ity. Fourth, robust data collection on prices, access, population health metrics, and quality 
are required both for states to fulfill their statutory duties of ensuring the COPA offers a 
continued public benefit and as evidence of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of COPAs 
as a policy tool to encourage integration while constraining the negative effects of consoli-
dation. Finally, even with rigorous oversight, the entity may not be financially sustainable, 
posing the risk that conditions will be worse, not better, than before the merger.
In sum, a state-based COPA is a risky policy solution that permits formation of health care 
monopolies in exchange for state regulatory authority. COPAs may be particularly attractive 
for states to gain regulatory authority over rural or other areas that struggle to support vig-
orous health care competition, but a COPA is a substantial regulatory undertaking requiring 
significant resources and vigilance. It remains an open question whether states can suc-
cessfully avoid the adverse outcomes of consolidation and reap the potential benefits in 
terms of population health, clinical integration, community investment, and maintenance 
of rural providers through COPAs, but Tennessee and Virginia are poised to try. 
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